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Introduction
Since the late 2000s, the ghost city phenomenon in China has beenwidely reported by international media. The phenomenon has also at-tracted interest from the scientific community. Most of these contri-
butions focused on extreme cases, including the resource-based boomtown
Ordos municipality, (2) a government-led mega urban project, Zhengdong
New District, (3) and a county relocated after an earthquake, New Bei-
chuan. (4) Yet, these accounts focusing on extreme cases cannot give a fair
representation of the phenomenon as a whole. (5) In fact, more and more
“ordinary” cities have appeared in the list of ghost cities since 2010. In 2014,
50 Chinese cities were labelled as ghost cities by China Urban Construction
Statistical Yearbook, including 42 prefecture-level cities and eight county-
level cities. (6) Among them, only one city is regarded as a second-tier city,
while the rest are third- and fourth-tier or even fifth-and sixth-tier cities. (7)
Despite the above reports, there are methodological difficulties in assess-
ing the scope of the ghost city phenomenon, in particular the lack of a stan-
dard definition of a “ghost city.” Shepard Wade listed several definitions of
ghost cities in his book.(8) One point is clear: it is necessary to redefine the
ghost city, which was originally considered “a place that has died” or “an
abandoned city.” One common feature of Chinese ghost cities is high va-
cancy rates in their residential developments. However, the Chinese gov-
ernment has not published any data related to housing vacancy rates.
Another definition is based on the population density of an urban built-up
area. For example, the population density in the built-up area of the 50
ghost cities identified in 2014 was between 700 and 5,400 inhabitants per
km2, far below the 10,000 inhabitants per km2 required by the National Plan
of New Urbanization. (9) An alternative method has also been used for mea-
suring ghost cities through big data. (10) In this study, the main concern is
the formation of the ghost city phenomenon in a third-tier city with the
evolution of macro-economic context. Thus, we opt for indicators such as
housing stock and land supply to assess the process of forming a ghost city,
as well as indicators such as population density and land use to examine
the phenomenon on the urban scale. 
Excess housing supply in a portion of Chinese cities attracted the attention
of the central government. At the 11th meeting of the Central Finance and
Economy Leading Group on 10 November 2015, President Xi Jinping
stressed that China should strengthen structural reform on the supply front
to increase the quality and efficiency of the supply system in the New Nor-
mal era. (11) One of the key tasks of this reform is to promote the absorp-
tion of excess production capacity. With regard to the real estate industry,
“reducing stock (qukucun)” is seen as a critical measure to reach this target.
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1. In 2014, President Xi Jinping proclaimed that China was entering a “New Normal.” The term was
indicative of the Chinese government’s anticipation of moderate but more balanced economic
growth as opposed to the high-speed growth of the last three decades. Source: Wang Jinwen, “The
‘New’ and ‘Normal’ in the discourse of Xi Jinping about ‘New Normal,’” http://www.
chinanews.com/gn/2014/08-10/6477530.shtml (accessed on December 6, 2016)
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Opportunity for a Paradigm Shift? The Case of Changzhou
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ABSTRACT: In the late 2000s, the phenomenon of ghost cities emerged in China, including not only boomtowns such as Ordos but also “ordi-
nary” third- and fourth-tier cities such as Changzhou. Based on a conceptual framework of China’s land-driven growth machine under entre-
preneurial governance, we update the ghost city phenomenon through an in-depth empirical study of a third-tier city, Changzhou. The objective
of this paper is to expand our understanding of how excessive accumulation of real estate assets has come to dominate the landscape of this
type of city against the background of China’s economic slowdown. The author argues that overbuilding is due to the malfunction of the classic
urban expansion model under entrepreneurial governance. In the case of Changzhou, the local government continued massive “sales” of resi-
dential and commercial land while effective housing demand was declining due to slowdowns in the local manufacturing industry and in popu-
lation growth. In response to the “New Normal” (1) advocated by the central government, the government of Changzhou redirected its land and
housing policy. Nevertheless, more profound reforms are needed to change the paradigm of growth-oriented urbanism. 
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Meanwhile, the National Plan of New Urbanisation (2014-2020) (12) pro-
posed a more compact urban form by controlling urban development land
per capita to within 100 m2, which is equivalent to a population density of
10,000 inhabitants per km2. These national policies implied the willingness
of the central government to transform the current growth-oriented urban-
isation model into a people-oriented one. In this light, it is necessary to take
into consideration the changing macro-economic environment and its im-
pact on land and housing policies at the local level.
Changzhou is a third-tier city (13) located at the heart of the Yangtze River
Delta. It was one of the first ghost cities reported by China’s official CCTV
in January 2013. (14) The city was labelled a ghost city owing to an abun-
dance of unoccupied residential projects, especially in its new districts. Al-
though the local government argued that Changzhou’s local real estate
market was prosperous and the vacancy rate in residential areas was no
more than 20%, (15) statistics showed that the
excess supply of commodity housing was not
an illusion. The city’s commodity housing
stock increased from 4.36 million m2 in 2006
to 10.12 million m2 in 2013, representing an
increase of 132% within eight years. The ro-
tation time for destocking commodity hous-
ing inventory (shangpinzhufang qukucun
zhouqi) (16) reached a peak in 2014 at 18
months, which was much higher than the rea-
sonable range of 6 to 12 months. (17) Notwith-
standing, it is an exaggeration to consider the
entire city a ghost city, since the phenomenon
is concentrated in the new districts. In 2014,
the permanent population density of Wujin
District was 5,390 inhabitants/km2, much
lower than the districts in the city proper,
which had a population density of more than
10,000 inhabitants/ km2 (figure 1). Given that,
the paper examines the case of Changzhou
with a focus on one of its new districts, Wujin,
where the problem of overbuilding is more
acute than in the city proper. 
Based on a conceptual framework of China’s
land-driven growth machine under en-
trepreneurial governance, this paper aims to
answer the following questions with an in-
depth empirical study: What is the process of
forming a “ghost city” in the case of an ordi-
nary third-tier city, Changzhou? What is the
underlying reason for overbuilding in such a
city against the background of slowdown in
industrial and demographic growth? Are
changes in housing and land policy in
Changzhou under the New Normal a sign of
paradigm shift in Chinese urbanism? To an-
swer these questions, we start with a discus-
sion on the land-driven growth machine and
the urban form shaped by this mechanism.
This echoes the view of scholars who attribute
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12. This urban development land use standard is stricter than that stipulated by the “Code for clas-
sification of urban land use and planning standards for development land (GB50137-2011),” pro-
mulgated in 2012. The latter stipulated maximum urban development land per capita of 105 m2
in a newly built city, 115 m2 in a capital city, and 150 m2 in some cities in remote border regions,
mountainous regions, resource-based regions, and tourist areas. See “Code for classification of
urban land use and planning standards for development land (GB50137-2011).” 
13. Changzhou was described as a third-tier city in the classification published by the official website
China.com: Cheng Xue, “List of Chinese first-tier, second-tier and third-tier cities in 2015,”
http://henan.china.com.cn/finance/2015/0624/519547.shtml (accessed on 29 December 2016).
14. CCTV, “Changzhou considered as another Ghost city, developers and investors gambling on hous-
ing price,” http://house.ifeng.com/detail/2013_01_14/31165666_0.shtml, (accessed on 17 March
2016).
15. Ma Ben, “Changzhou was reported as ghost city by CCTV due to its high level of housing stock”
http://news.xinhuanet.com/house/2013-01/15/c_124231924.htm, (accessed on 9 March 2016).
16. The rotation time for destocking commodity housing inventory is an indicator derived from in-
dustry and commonly used in China to measure the status of real estate market.
17. BHSREMC, 2015 nian Changzhoushi fangdichan shichang yunxing qingkuang baogao, (Annual re-
port of real estate market in Changzhou city (2015)), intern document (in Chinese).
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Figure 1 – Permanent population density in different subdivisions of
Changzhou city in 2014
Source: adapted and translated by the author according to the CCPDI (2015) 
the ghost city phenomenon to China’s land-centred urbanisation of a spec-
ulative nature under developmentalism. (18) Nonetheless, our study differs
from the existing literature in the following aspects: first, rather than focus-
ing on extreme forms of urban development, we update the ghost city phe-
nomenon in mainland China by looking at an ordinary third-tier city,
Changzhou, where vacancies are mainly connected with residential pro-
grams rather than “face projects” (mianzi gongcheng) for aesthetic purposes
(sculptural landmarks such as museums, libraries, theatres, squares, etc.).
This challenges the concept of “phantom urbanisation” based on the expe-
rience of Ordos and New Beichuan with an over-emphasis on the aesthetic
urban form. (19) Second, we situate the phenomenon in the context of the
changing macro-economic environment and examine the dynamics of
Changzhou’s land and real estate market over the past decade. Given
Changzhou’s  efforts to reduce housing stock under the New Normal, we
also assess the effects of related measures and discuss the possibility of a
paradigm shift from growth-oriented to people-oriented urbanisation. (20)
Third, we highlight the heterogeneity of the ghost city phenomenon within
the territory of Changzhou by focusing on its new district, Wujin. Compared
to the city proper, the new district has been more prone to overbuilding
due to a lax land control system and greater dependence on land finance.
This study used data provided by the Bureau of Housing Security and Real
Estate Management of Changzhou (hereafter BHSREMC), Changzhou City
Planning and Design Institute (hereafter CCPDI), and Municipal Bureau of
Statistics of Changzhou (hereafter MBSC). In addition, semi-structured inter-
views with officials and urban planners from BHSREMC and CCPDI as well as
on-site observation carried out by the author were employed for the study.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: first, we build a conceptual
framework for an urban expansion model for third-and fourth-tier cities based
on China’s land-driven growth machine. In the second section, we investigate
the case of Changzhou to illustrate the process of ghost city formation under
entrepreneurial governance, with a focus on Wujin New District. Next, we ex-
amine changes in Changzhou’s land and housing policies in the new context
and discuss the possibility of a paradigm shift in Chinese urbanism. 
China’s land-driven growth machine based
on urban entrepreneurialism
The concept of urban entrepreneurialism based on Western experience (21)
has been widely used to describe China’s growth-oriented urban gover-
nance. (22) In particular, Wu Fulong explicated the institutional set-up that
has turned the city into a growth machine. (23) First, the official evaluation
system that emphasises local economic performance drives officials to pur-
sue GDP growth. Local leaders become virtual CEOs of “urban development
corporations,” endeavouring to improve the city’s competitiveness. (24) Sec-
ond, pressure on local public finance drives the local government to initiate
mega urban development projects to gain land revenue. Since the tax-shar-
ing reforms in 1994, local governments have been allowed to keep revenue
derived from land lease transactions to meet ongoing public expenditure.
At the same time, economic devolution allowed the central government to
delegate social and public services to the local governments. Consequently,
the financing of urban infrastructure and facilities has depended greatly on
this revenue, which accounts for a substantial share of municipal govern-
ments’ total revenues. (25) This institutional arrangement has transformed
the Chinese city into a land-driven growth machine. 
Classic urban expansion model under
entrepreneurial governance in China
The land-driven growth machine has shaped the urban spatial pattern of
Chinese cities. In the context of globalisation, China has accelerated the
pace of industrialisation based on an export-oriented economy. The local
government is enthusiastic about creating industrial zones to attract man-
ufacturing activities and thus to stimulate the local economy. Owing to
fierce inter-city competition, the common practice of local governments is
to lease industrial land to investors at a cheap and subsidised price. (26) The
aim is to use industrial development to stimulate the local economy as a
whole, and use the “spill-over” effect to increase demand for housing and
for commercial and retail space. (27) In contrast to cheap industrial land, res-
idential and commercial land is leased by the local government at a higher
market price to real estate developers. Due to fact that only the local gov-
ernment can convert rural land into state land for urban development, it
usually pays relatively low compensation to the existing users, for example
farmers. (28) The price gap constitutes the local government’s land revenue,
which is used to finance urban infrastructure and to provide public services.
In this classic urban expansion model, industrial development is regarded
as a driving force for the local economy, which is expected to attract both
activities and population. Theoretically, residential and commercial land ex-
pands based on increasing housing demand and contributes to urban ex-
pansion in tandem with the expansion of industrial land (figure 2).
Urban expansion model under entrepreneurial
governance in Chinese third- and fourth-tier cities
The ghost city phenomenon in most third- and fourth-tier cities is related
to the rapid expansion of residential and commercial land and low housing
demand. China’s economic slowdown since 2010 has had an impact on the
local economy of many third- and fourth-tier cities. While the Chinese 
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18. Yu Hong, “China’s ‘Ghost Cities’,” art. cit., pp. 33-42; Shin Hyun Bang, “Contesting speculative ur-
banisation and strategising discontents,” City: Analysis of urban trends, culture, theory, policy, ac-
tion, Vol. 18, No. 4-5, 2014, pp. 509-516.
19. Christian Sorace and William Hurst, “China’s phantom urbanisation and the pathology of ghost
cities,” art. cit., 2016, pp. 304-322.
20. “Prime Minister Li Keqiang has promoted a new-type of ‘people-oriented urbanization’,” http://fi-
nance.qq.com/a/20130319/001198.htm (accessed on December 29, 2016). 
21. Susan Fainstein, The city builders, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1994; David Harvey, “From man-
agerialism to entrepreneurialism: The transformation in the urban governance in late capitalism.”
Geografiska Annaler, Vol. 71, No. B, 1989, pp. 3-18.
22. Wu Fulong, “Re-orientation of the city plan: Strategic planning and design competition in China.”
Geoforum, Vol. 38, 2007, pp. 379–392.
23. Wu Fulong, Planning for Growth: Urban and Regional Planning in China, New York and London,
Routledge, 2015, pp. 50-72.
24. Shuih-Shen Chien, “The isomorphism of local development policy: A case study of the formation
and transformation of national development zones in post-Mao Jiangsu, China,” Urban Studies,
Vol. 45, No. 2, 2008, pp. 273-294.
25. Tao Ran, Su Fubing, Liu Mingxing, and Cao Guangzhong, “Land Leasing and Local Public Finance
in China’s Regional Development: Evidence from Prefecture-level Cities,” Urban Studies, Vol. 47,
No. 10, 2010, pp. 2217-2236; George Lin and Yi Fangxin “Urbanization of capital or capitalization
on urban land? Land development and local public finance in urbanizing China,” Urban Geography,
Vol. 32, No. 1, 2011, pp. 50-79.
26. Zhang Jingxiang, Zhao Dan, and Chen Hao, “Zengzhang zhuyi de zhongji yu zhongguo cheng-
shiguihua de zhuanxing,” (Termination of growth supremacism and transformation of China’s
urban planning) City Planning Review, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2013, pp. 45-55.
27. Wu Fulong, Planning for Growth: Urban and Regional Planning in China, op. cit., pp. 50-72. 
28. Ibid. 
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government attempts to transition from an export-driven economy to one
based on domestic demand, the majority of these cities, based on export-
oriented manufacturing, are facing the difficulty of economic restructur-
ing. Consequently, the growth of the urban population has slowed down
due to sluggish manufacturing sectors. Meanwhile, existing housing de-
mand is not strong. On the one hand, homeownership in these cities is
much higher than in first- and second-tier cities. On the other hand, spec-
ulative demand in these cities is lower than in first- and second-tier cities
due to relatively moderate housing prices and low attractiveness. In ad-
dition, rural migrant workers, although frequently suffering from poor liv-
ing conditions, (29) have few opportunities to own housing in urban
destinations due to their poor economic conditions and institutional bar-
riers. (30) As a result, effective housing demand in third- and fourth-tier
cities has been low. 
Nevertheless, local governments in third- and fourth-tier cities have been
keen to expand residential and commercial land over the past decade. As
the monopolistic supplier in the primary land market, local governments
control the quota of serviced residential and commercial land based on
local economic needs rather than on effective housing demand. This is due
to several overlapping factors. 
First, as in most Chinese cities, urban expansion and real estate develop-
ment have been used to promote the local economy in third- and fourth-
tier cities. Urbanisation has boosted China’s industrial development and
economic growth over the past three decades. Since the housing reforms
in 1998, the urbanisation process has been accelerated by a booming real
estate sector, which was identified as “the pillar industry of the national
economy.” (31) The contribution of this sector to national GDP increased from
4% in 1997 to 15% in 2015. (32) Despite a short decline between 2008 and
2009, the market was booming again after the intervention of the central
government. Under these circumstances, local governments have encour-
aged real estate investment, especially in new districts and new towns, so
as to boost local GDP, the top criterion of the official evaluation system. At
the same time, urban expansion and real estate development can bring sig-
nificant land revenue and fiscal revenue to local governments, allowing
them to finance urban infrastructure and thus contribute to physical
changes in the city – another criterion in the official evaluation system. 
Second, in third- and fourth-tier cities, while industrial development has
slowed down, the local economy has become more dependent on land fi-
nance and real estate development. Compared to first- and second-tier
cities, third- and fourth-tier cities have more difficulty achieving economic
restructuring and upgrading, given their lack of qualified professionals and
high technology. Instead, real estate development constitutes a more effi-
cient means of accumulation for local officials, who are more concerned
about short-term economic growth and visible achievements. In other word,
third- and fourth-tier cities remain in the process of commingling the pri-
mary circuit of low-cost labour-intensive production with the second circuit
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29. Wang Yaping, “Living conditions of migrants in inland Chinese cities,” Journal of Comparative Asian
Development, 2/1, pp. 47-69, 2003; John. R. Logan and Susan S. Fainstein, (eds), “Introduction:
Urban China in comparative perspective,” in Urban China in transition, Oxford, Blackwell, 2008,
pp. 1-23.
30. Lu Ping and Zhou Tao, “Housing for rural migrant workers: Consumption characteristics and supply
policy,” Urban Policy and Research, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2008, pp. 297-308.
31. Li Mingye, “De la planification à la bulle immobilière: Le logement en Chine,” Études Foncières,
No. 151, 2011, pp. 27-33; State Council, Guowuyuan guanyu cujin fangdichan shichan chixu
jiankang fazhan de tongzhi (Notice from the State Council on Promoting a Continuous and
Healthy Development of the Real estate Market), 2003.
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Développeur,” article presented at the Colloque International Recherche et Régulation 2015, Paris.
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Figure 2 – Classic urban expansion model under entrepreneurial governance in China
Source: compiled by the author according to Zhang Jingxiang, Zhao Dan, and Chen Hao, “Zengzhang zhuyi de zhongji yu zhongguo chengshiguihua de zhuanxing” (Termination
of growth supremacism and transformation of China’s urban planning), City Planning Review, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2013, pp. 45-55; Wu Fulong, Planning for Growth: Urban and 
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of investment in built environment. (33) This point echoes Lin and Zhang’s
findings that “the importance of land sales as a means of revenue generation
has declined as the level of urban economic growth improves.” (34)
Third, compared to first- and second-tier cities, third- and fourth-tier cities
generally apply a less strict land control policy. In the case of the former, in
order to maximise land revenue, local governments have released only a
limited amount of urban land for housing and commercial development,
which in turn results in high land prices, (35) whereas in the case of the latter,
given the moderate land prices, local governments have adopted an oppo-
site strategy by releasing a large amount of residential and commercial land
so as to increase total land revenue. 
To sum up, under the current institutional system, urban expansion and real
estate development are used by urban governments to boost the local economy.
In the context of China’s slowdown, reliance upon the real estate sector in Chi-
nese third- and fourth-tier cities is more significant than in first- and second-tier
cities. The residential real estate sector has replaced the manufacturing industry
as the driving force of the local economy. As a result, residential and commercial
land expands at a faster pace than the growth of housing demand in these cities.
This has eventually led to overbuilding and even the ghost city phenomenon. 
Changzhou: Formation of a ghost city under
entrepreneurial governance
A third-tier city in fierce inter-city competition
Changzhou is a prefecture-level city located in the heart of the Yangtze
Delta, midway between Nanjing and Shanghai. In 2014, the population of
Changzhou municipality reached 4.69 million, of which 3.38 million lived
in Changzhou City (shiqu). (36) In 2014, Changzhou City had an urban devel-
opment area of 326.6 km2, which consisted of the city proper covering the
whole area of Tianning, Zhonglou, and Qishuyan districts, as well as part of
its two new districts, Xinbei in the north and Wujin in the south. (37)
In the 1980s, Changzhou experienced a period of prosperity based on its
fast industrialisation. Representing one third of the GDP of the province of
Jiangsu, Changzhou was a star among industrial medium-sized cities at that
time. (38) However, the external environment changed rapidly. In the 1990s,
a large number of local enterprises were defeated by foreign-invested en-
terprises in the Pearl River Delta and the lively private economy of the Wen-
zhou region. Since then, Changzhou has lagged behind. 
In the 2000s, in a context of fierce inter-city competition, there was a
strong willingness within the Changzhou government to enhance the city’s
economic competitiveness and to regain its leading place in the province.
Nevertheless, constrained by fragmented governance and an unclear indus-
trial strategy, the city has had difficulty changing its economic position in
the region. In 2015, Changzhou ranked sixth among the 13 prefecture-level
cities of the province of Jiangsu in terms of GDP. (39) Under the current offi-
cial evaluation system, which privileges economic targets, local officials in
Changzhou have no choice but to stimulate growth at all costs. 
The real estate sector as pillar industry of the local
economy
In contrast to a slowing-down manufacturing industrial sector, the real
estate sector in Changzhou City has become a pillar industry of the local
economy since the mid-2000s. From 2006 to 2015, total investment in this
sector reached 451.0 billion yuan with an annual investment of 45 billion
yuan representing 20% of the fixed-asset investment in Changzhou City. (40)
Between 2006 and 2008, real estate investment increased at an annual
growth rate of 34%. This strong growth trend was interrupted by the global
economic crisis. Thereafter, in response to national policy, the local govern-
ment took measures to “save the market,” such as lowering down payments
for housing loans, which led to a new round of rapid growth between 2009
and 2013. In 2013, investment reached a peak of 69.9 billion yuan. In the
same year, CCTV reported that Changzhou was a ghost city. Since then, the
local government has redirected its land and housing policy, resulting in a
decline in investment in the subsequent years.
The reliance of the local economy upon the real estate sector has been re-
flected in two aspects. First, from 2006 to 2015, total revenue derived from land
lease transactions amounted to 102.1 billion yuan. (41) The ratio of land revenue
to local budgetary revenue increased from 39% in 2006 to 90% in 2010. By way
of contrast, the average ratio in Chinese prefectural-level cities was 53%, and
42% for those in the eastern regions in 2008. (42) Changzhou’s land revenue has
contributed significantly to the development of the city’s urban infrastructure
during this period, which in turn has increased reliance on land finance. 
Second, tax revenue related to real estate development (43) and its ratio
to local budgetary revenue have steadily increased during the last decade.
In 2013, this revenue reached 11.5 billion, representing 28% of Changzhou’s
local budgetary revenue (see table in Annex). According to an official of BH-
SREMC, the real estate sector was the only sector that contributed more
than 10 billion yuan to the city’s local tax revenue. (44) By contrast, in first-
and second-tier cities, an augmented and diversified tax base has made re-
liance upon real estate sector less significant. For instance, the ratio of real
estate development-related tax to local budgetary revenue in Beijing re-
mained below 20% from 2008 to 2014 (45) (Figure 3). 
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44. Interview with an official of BHSREMC, 2 September 2015.
45. China index academy, “Land transfer fee of Beijing reached 200 billion yuan in 2015,”
http://land.fang.com/zt/201512/pdcrj.html, (accessed on 14 December 2016); Statistical Yearbook
of Beijing 2008-2015.
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Rapid expansion of residential and commercial land
deviated from effective demand
As in many third-and fourth-tier cities, planning has been used as an in-
strument to promote local development under entrepreneurial governance
in Changzhou. Following the Changzhou Master Plan (1996-2010), which
proposed “controlling the east and the west, developing the south and the
north,” two new districts, Xinbei and Wujin, were subsequently created north
and south of the city proper. The new districts planned as growth poles for
the city have become the major directions of urban expansion. This spatial
structure, called “one centre plus two wings,” was then consolidated in the
Changzhou Master Plan (2011-2020). Under this expansionist approach,
the urban development area (chengshi jianshe yongdi) of Changzhou grew
from 261.38 km2 in 2008 to 326.57 km2 in 2014, an increase of 25% within
six years. 
The rapid urban expansion in a short timeframe was achieved through
large amounts of land being converted from rural collective land to urban
state land by the local government. Thereafter, as the monopolistic supplier
in the primary land market, the local government leased or allocated the
serviced land to real estate developers. As shown in Figure 3, during the pe-
riod from 2008 to 2012, the area of leased and allocated land for residential
and commercial use more than tripled to 1,273 hectares in 2012. With re-
spect to industrial land supply, although there was a short rise after the
global crisis of 2008, it began to decline in 2011. As can be seen, since 2010
the evolution of commercial and residential land supply has deviated from
that of industrial land (Figure 4).
Nevertheless, the supply of industrial land has been highly correlated with
the growth rate of the industrial sector and the permanent population of
Changzhou City. In the context of China’s economic slowdown, there has
been a decline in the growth rate of Changzhou’s industrial sector. Accord-
ingly, the growth of industrial land supply has declined, and has been ac-
companied by a deceleration in urban population growth (see table in
Annex). Considering the high homeownership rates among the existing
urban population in Changzhou, (46) effective housing demand has thus be-
come saturated in such a context. 
The oversupply of residential and commercial land has led to overbuilding
in the housing and commercial sector. Compared to first- and second-tier
cities, land prices have been moderate in Changzhou, attracting small and
medium-sized real estate developers. Most of them have a local background
and created a close relationship with the local government. For example,
Xincheng Dichan is a residential real estate developer founded in Changzhou
in 1993. With 21 residential projects for sale in Changzhou, it was ranked
first in terms of value of sales in 2014. In order to maximise profits, most
residential developers chose to build high-rise apartments. 
Another factor in the construction frenzy in Changzhou is the 2010 com-
pletion of the Nanjing-Shanghai high-speed railway, which stops in
Changzhou. The expected shorter journey time to Shanghai and Nanjing
from Changzhou produced speculative interest in new real estate properties.
The location of a new high-speed railway station was deliberately chosen
in Xinbei New District with the aim of promoting urbanisation. However,
compared to other cities in proximity to a mega-city, Changzhou, located
between two mega-cities, has enjoyed less urban integration. (47) As a result,
speculative housing demand was not as strong as expected, leading to an
oversupply of housing, especially near the new high-speed railway station
in Xinbei. 
Owing to insufficient housing demand, the sale of both commodity build-
ing (including office and commercial space) and commodity housing began
to decline in 2010 (see table in Annex). Consequently, from 2010 to 2014,
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the stock of both commodity building and commodity housing kept in-
creasing and reached  record levels of 17.66 million m2 in 2014 and 10.12
million m2 in 2013 (see table in Annex). High stock levels in newly-built res-
idential and commercial programs led to a high vacancy rate, and thus
caused the ghost city phenomena.
Focus on Wujin New District
Despite high stock levels in newly-built residential developments in
Changzhou, it would be exaggerating to consider the whole city a ghost
city, given the great disparity between the city proper and the new districts
in terms of population density. The problem of overbuilding has been con-
centrated in new districts, where urban expansion has been much faster
than in the city proper during the last decade. In order to deepen our un-
derstanding of the process of forming a ghost city under entrepreneurial
governance, we focus on Wujin New District, which was the major focus of
the ghost city phenomenon in Changzhou reported by CCTV. 
As the cradle of the Sunan model, (48) Wujin used to be a county located
south of Changzhou City. Because of its early rural industrialisation based
on township and villages enterprises (TVEs), it had a sound economic per-
formance and was ranked second among the “Top 100 counties of China
(zhongguo baiqiangxian)” (49) in 1992. In 1993, the Wujin County govern-
ment office moved from Changzhou City proper to Wutang Town in Wujin
in 1993, allowing Wujin to have a city-centre based on Wutang Town. In
1995, Wujin County was transformed into a county-level city, which con-
solidated its status as a relatively independent city. In 2002, Wujin was in-
tegrated into Changzhou as an urban district. Since then, Wujin New
District has accelerated its urban development by multiplying its fixed
asset investment by ten times. (50) Nevertheless, settlement of Wujin New
District proceeded at a slower rate than hoped. As a result, its population
density is much lower than districts in the city proper (see Figure 1). The
stock of newly-built commodity housing reached 2.8 million m2 in 2014,
which was four times that of Zhonglou District and twice of that of Tian-
ning District. (51) In essence, this is the outcome of rapid urban expansion
of the new district under entrepreneurial governance. In particular, the
specifics of Wujin District in terms of its administrative status, planning
strategy, and urban financing model have reinforced the land-driven
growth machine. 
First, compared to other urban districts, land control is more lax in Wujin.
Although Wujin was integrated into Changzhou as an urban district in 2002,
the district government managed to maintain its autonomy over the local
fiscal budget, land management, and urban planning that should have been
turned over to the prefecture-level municipality. (52) This was due to the eco-
nomic strength and local identity of Wujin, which raised the political stakes
in negotiation. As a result, there has been less top-down control from the
municipal government over the new district. For example, Wujin has applied
a less strict land control policy compared with other districts. The aim was
to stimulate local economic growth through aggressive land development.
In 2013, the district government of Wujin leased 732 hectares of land and
allocated 309 hectares of land for urban development, which represented
respectively 60% and 62% of land leased and allocated in Changzhou. From
2008 to 2014, the urban development area of Wujin increased by 60% to
reach an area of 110.0 km2 in 2014. (53) This has already exceeded the 100
km2 of urban development area planned for 2020. 
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52. Interview with an urban planner in Changzhou City Planning and Design Institute, 5 September
2015. 
53. Changzhou City Planning and Design Institute, Changzhou city construction development report
(2008-2015), Changzhou chengshi jianshe fazhan baogao, internal document (in Chinese).
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Second, urban development in Wujin did not follow a plan that gave a
holistic view of the new district. Originating with TVEs (mostly small-and
medium-size industrial units), the industrial development of Wujin grew out
of control and was scattered throughout the territory. In order to rationalise
its industrial development and build a modern new city, the Changzhou
Master Plan (2011-2020) proposed to plan the new district as Changzhou
city’s southern wing with three functional zones: an urban core in the centre
of the district, a western zone near Gehu Lake for tourist, ecological, leisure,
and residential functions, and a southern zone for high-tech industrial and
logistic activities. In reality, instead of following the Master Plan, the district
government proposed organising urban development around eight func-
tional “plates” (bankuai). These plates included three tourist zones, two eco-
logical and agricultural parks, two industrial parks, and one techno-city. In
this way, the district government, which functions like a corporation, at-
tempted to materialise its economic development target in the specific
urban space. However, this has led to a fragmented land use pattern (Figure
5) that consumed large amounts of land but attracted insufficient popula-
tion. Moreover, the plates suffer from poor connections between them,
making the spatial structure of the new district less compact than for dis-
tricts in the city proper.
Third, under entrepreneurial governance, local government-run financ-
ing vehicles (LGFVs) have been used to support the urban development
of the new district. Unlike new districts in first- and second-tier cities,
Wujin New District has gained little support from the central or provin-
cial governments. For example, gaining the title of “special zone” or “ex-
perimental zone” for national strategy allows application for
preferential policies and can stimulate the inflow of investment. (54) In
order to support the cost of urban development, the district govern-
ment had to seek capital from private investors. Against this back-
ground, eight LGFVs have been set up, corresponding to the eight
functional plates (55) (Figure 5). While the creation of LGFVs is a com-
mon practice in Chinese cities, Wujin is exceptional in creating one
LGFV devoted to each functional plate. For instance, the plate called
“Changzhou Techno-city,” located in the centre of Wujin District, is
managed by the LGFV “Changzhou Techno-city Investment Corpora-
tion.” Each LGFV followed the principle of “self-financing, self-devel-
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trepreneurialism: The case of Wujin’s new city district” (difangzhengfu zhudaoxia de xincheng
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Figure 5 – Urban land use and functional “plates” of Wujin District in 2014
Source: Compiled by author according to CCPDI, 2015.
opment, and self-management.” (56) This means that each LGFV is
equivalent to a corporation in charge of the urban development within
the plate. Meanwhile, the leader of each LGFV is a government official,
which ensures the leadership role of the local government in the de-
velopment of the functional plate. This entrepreneurial governance al-
lowed the functional plates to gain financing from the market, which
accelerated the urban development of Wujin at the early stage. Never-
theless, this became problematic with the progress of the urban project.
Each LGFV functioned like a company, maximising economic interest
and leading to more competition than coordination between them. In
particular, due to overlapped functions and similar development strate-
gies, in order to attract investors, the plates had to “sell” land at a cheap
price. This accelerated the expansion of each plate. In addition, under
the self-financing principle, the plates became highly dependent on res-
idential and commercial real estate development, because in order to
achieve financing equilibrium, they had to lease sufficient residential
and commercial land to balance the cheap land leased to investors in
the targeted activities in the plate. Thus, the residential and commercial
projects were programmed based on the financing needs of each LGFV
rather than on effective demand. This resulted in an abundance of un-
occupied residential and commercial projects in each plate. 
In short, the case of Wujin shows that the new districts of third- and
fourth- tier cities have pushed the land-driven growth machine to a new
level through more lax land control, more growth-oriented urban spatial
plans, and more entrepreneurial governance. Consequently, the ghost city
phenomenon is more significant in these newly built urban areas.
Changzhou redirects its land and housing
policy in the context of “New Normal”
Recent remarks by President Xi Jinping regarding China’s “New Normal” have
heralded China’s entrance into a new era of slower economic growth where the
method of stimulating economic growth through large-scale public investment
incentives is no longer as simple as before. In response, the central government
has launched a series of policies around the target of reducing stock. The Min-
istry of Land Resources has stated that land quotas for commodity housing de-
velopment need to be reduced in cities with excess housing stock. (57) One of
the decisions of the 11th meeting of the Central Finance and Economy Leading
Group was to facilitate housing purchases for rural migrants so as to expand
effective housing demand. (58)
In the case of Changzhou, owing to its notorious reputation as ghost city, the
municipal government became a pioneer in redirecting land and housing policies
in the new context. Since 2013, five measures have been taken to reduce hous-
ing stock: first, control land supply. In 2014, the municipal government said it
would stop land supply for three years, except for land lease contracts signed
in 2013. This had a great impact on land revenue and the real estate sector in
Changzhou. In 2015, land revenue was reduced to 0.6 billion yuan, only 2% of
that in 2010 (see table in Annex). Investment in the real estate sector declined
by 27% from 2013 to 2015. Second, control the supply of newly-built com-
modity housing. Specifically, the municipal government required developers to
postpone the delivery of residential projects. Consequently, in 2014, the supply
of newly-built commodity housing decreased by 30% in 2014 and by 40% in
2015. (59) Third, use commodity housing for social housing and resettlement
housing programs. Given the large stock of commodity housing, the government
considered it no longer necessary to develop specific housing programs for social
purposes or to resettle expropriated households. Instead, the government began
to grant a housing allowance or housing voucher to the targeted population so
they could purchase a home on the market. Fourth, lower the minimum down
payment ratio in housing loans. In order to support housing purchases, the gov-
ernment reduced the minimum down payment ratio in housing loans from the
Housing Provident Fund Program(60) to 20% in 2015. Fifth, diversify the housing
supply. To satisfy people’s diversified demand, the government encouraged de-
velopers to diversify their housing products. Apart from high-rise apartments,
developers are encouraged to develop other housing developments such as in-
dividual houses, retirement homes, etc. 
Among these measures, land supply control is the most severe, and has a
direct effect on housing stock levels. In 2014, the stock of commodity housing
began to decline. Meanwhile, the local government paid a heavy price in terms
of land revenue. Consequently, there has been greater pressure on local public
finance. In 2012, the local debt of the Changzhou municipal government was
estimated at 35.4 billion yuan, representing 90% of local GDP. (61) Deprived of
land revenue, the local government will be forced to increase the debt level,
putting the government’s financial stability at risk. Without profound reform
of the land development system, land supply control tends to be a temporary
measure rather than a sustainable solution. Similarly, restricting the supply
of newly-built commodity housing is likely to be a temporary action. On the
other hand, there have been encouraging changes on the supply side, such as
the granting of housing allowances and diversifying the housing supply. 
Discussion and conclusions
This paper updates the ghost city phenomenon of mainland China through
an in-depth empirical study of a third-tier city, Changzhou. As demonstrated
by this case, overbuilding is related to aggressive urban expansion and low
housing demand during the last decade. In essence, this is an outcome of a
land-driven growth machine under entrepreneurial governance. Pushed by
the current official evaluation system centred on economic targets, the local
authorities have controlled land quotas based on local economic need
rather than effective housing demand. They have endeavoured to maintain
the prosperity of the real estate market, which constitutes the pillar industry
of the local economy. These practices caused an over-reliance on land fi-
nance and the real estate sector. What makes the situation worse is China’s
economic slowdown since 2010. Under these conditions, housing demand
in Changzhou has become much lower than in first- and second-tier cities
due to its sluggish manufacturing industry and high homeownership rate,
while the city’s reliance on land finance and the real estate sector has been
N o . 2 0 1 7 / 1  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 77
56. Mai Jing and Zhang Jingxiang, “A research on new city spatial development led by local en-
trepreneurialism: The case of Wujin’s new city district” (difangzhengfu zhudaoxia de xincheng
kongjian kaifa yanjiu: jiyu changzhoushi wujin xinchengqu de shizheng), Urban Planning Forum,
op. cit. 
57. Huang Tao, “Ministry of Land and Resources required to reduce land supply for commodity housing
development,” http://ehsb.hsw.cn/shtml/hsb/20160111/565141.shtml (accessed on 20 May
2016).
58. Cai Yunkun, “More than twenty provinces set up policies to encourage rural migrants to purchase
homes,” http://business.sohu.com/20160408/n443660932.shtml (accessed on 20 May 2016).
59. BHSREMC, 2015 nian Changzhoushi fangdichan shichang yunxing qingkuang baogao, (Annual re-
port of real estate market in Changzhou city[2015]), internal document (in Chinese).
60. The Housing Provident Fund Program is a compulsory savings program in Chinese cities in which
employers and employees contribute a certain percentage of the employee’s salary to a special
account. In return, employees can get low-interest mortgage loans for housing purchases. 
61. Generally, the debt level of local governments is not transparent. There is no official information
on the debt level in Changzhou. The estimate of local debt at 35.4 billion yuan was found in a
Chinese forum. Source: “local debt levels of Nanjing, Wuxi, and Changzhou,” https://
www.zhihu.com/question/31693175 (accessed on 21 May 2016).
Li Mingye – Evolution of Chinese Ghost Cities
more significant than in first- and second-tier cities. Because the ratio of
land revenue and real estate-related tax to local budgetary revenue in
Changzhou is higher than in first- and second-tier cities, the oversupply of
land and massive investment in residential real estate during this period has
led to excess housing stock in Changzhou.
Nevertheless, it is an exaggeration to consider the whole city a ghost city.
Compared to the city proper, Wujin New District has concentrated the prob-
lem of overbuilding. The land-driven growth machine has been pushed to a
new level owing to more lax land control, a more growth-oriented urban
spatial plan, and more entrepreneurial governance in the new district. The
eight LGFVs for the eight functional plates show an urbanism subordinated
to economic and financial objectives rather than to people’s needs. 
Under the New Normal, Changzhou has become a pioneer city in redi-
recting its land and housing policies. Several measures have been taken to
reduce housing stock, including strict controls on land supply. Although this
had a direct effect on housing stock, the local government has paid a heavy
price in terms of land revenue. With greater pressure on local public finance,
the local government is likely to raise its debt level, which has already been
very high through its LGFVs. This situation could potentially trigger a debt
crisis. Other measures such as the granting of housing allowances and di-
versifying the housing supply are encouraging. However, these measures do
not change the land-driven growth mechanism. 
In other word, more profound reforms are needed for a paradigm shift
from growth-oriented to people-centred urbanism. First, the current official
evaluation system centred on local economic growth has to be reformed
to a more comprehensive system. Second, changes to the existing public
finance system are needed. The monopoly local governments have over land
supply, and their dependency on land for revenue, have to be broken. (62) A
new system of tax and revenue sharing between central and local govern-
ments should be established to guarantee financial resources to local gov-
ernments in terms of infrastructure construction and social service
provision. (63) The above two reforms will facilitate changing the fate of local
state entrepreneurialism and eventually reduce the liabilities of local gov-
ernments to a reasonable level. In 2015, the Chinese government began to
restructure the liabilities of local governments through debt swaps, which
have made local governments’ mountain of debt look a little safer. (64) But
the root of the problem cannot be tackled without fundamental reform of
the official evaluation and fiscal systems.
In addition, institutional barriers on rural migrants in their urban destina-
tions should be removed. For example, they should have access to social
housing, which is currently intended exclusively for residents with urban
hukou in most of Chinese cities. Also, equal treatment in terms of housing
loans between urban and rural residents should be restored so as to facili-
tate home purchases by rural migrants in their urban destinations. Last but
not least, local authorities of third- and fourth-tier cities should be more
committed to restructuring and upgrading local industry under the New
Normal. These reforms are necessary to transform growth-oriented urban-
isation into a people-oriented one and to achieve the more sustainable and
balanced growth advocated by the Chinese government. 
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Summary table of the statistical data related to land management, industrial sector, population and 
real estate market in Changzhou city (2007-2014) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Industrial land (hectare) 798 582 714 956 591 552 677 542
Residential and 
commercial land (hectare)
604 403 654 843 792 1273 620 399
10181 5700 18115 25692 13335 14246 7832 1769
Growth rate of 
industrial sector
16.2% 12.10% 10.80% 13.2% 12.2% 11.7% 11.2% 9.5%
Growth rate of 
permanent population
3.14% 1.66% 1.28% 4.21% 1.43% 0.87% 0.17% 0.13%
Sales of commodity 
building 
6.65 5.23 10.83 9.11 6.34 7.96 8.31 8.27
Sales of commodity 
housing 
4.95 4.06 8.49 7.11 5.05 6.58 7.12 6.90
Stock of commodity 
building 
9.94 13.23 10.02 9.69 12.06 13.60 16.87 17.66
Stock of commodity 
housing 
5.96 8.00 5.27 4.87 6.79 7.78 10.12 10.09
*compiled by the author according to CCPDI, 2015 ** BHSREMC, 2015; the annual land revenue in Changzhou was 4632 million yuan in 2006 and 637 million yuan in 2015
*** compiled by the author according to the MBSC (2006-2015), CCPDI, 2015 **** BHSREMC, 2015.
Area of leased 
and allocated land*
Evolution of industrial 
sector and permanent
population***
Evolution of the sales 
and the stock of newly 
built commodity building 
and housing****
(million m2)
Annual land revenue (million yuan)**
